Lisa Feldman and the Constructive Theory of Emotions: A Critique Based on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Phenomenological Proposal

Abstract

For some years now, it has been tried to classify emotions by presupposing their existence outside the contexts in which they arise. In this work, a comparative analysis is carried out between Lisa Feldman’s proposal on the Constructive Theory of Emotions, versus the Sartrean critique that seeks to understand emotions from a phenomenological perspective. This analysis reviews how both positions are based to, later, delimit the areas in which they could collaborate, since both start from the contextual interpretation that humans have of their reality for the definition of their emotional states and seek to promote a more experiential approach to the identification of emotions. However, Feldman omits that Sartre had previously proposed that a phenomenological vision was required for the search for meaning in emotions, therefore, we seek to show how Sartre’s ideas complement Feldman’s vision.